This article examines key figures and events in modern Chinese history, including Zhou Enlai, the Whampoa Military Academy, the Gu Shunzhang family massacre, and the Jiangxi mass grave incident, revealing the internal power struggles and purges within the Chinese Communist Party.

Author: Er Ye

To facilitate reading, the editor of this website has made appropriate modifications without violating the original intent!

Zhou Enlai's First Appearance

Zhou Enlai is undoubtedly one of the most pivotal figures in the history of the Communist Party of China (CPC). He was once portrayed by official propaganda as a perfect leader, dedicated and selfless. The story of “the ten-mile-long street sending off the Premier” has elevated Zhou Enlai to a status surpassing even Mao Zedong in many Chinese textbooks. But what was the real Zhou Enlai like? Today, I'll share a few anecdotes about Zhou Enlai that might provide some answers.

Zhou Enlai’s debut in modern Chinese history was indeed spectacular. He first appeared as the renowned Director of the Political Department at the Whampoa Military Academy. The academy's fame is well-known; it trained many influential figures from both the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party, effectively condensing half of modern Chinese history into one institution.

Before Zhou Enlai, two heavyweight figures had served as the Director of the Political Department at Whampoa: Dai Jitao and Shao Yuanchong. Both were members of the Tongmenghui and veterans of the Xinhai Revolution, with remarkable achievements and fame, so it was not surprising that they held the position. However, Zhou Enlai, who succeeded them, was only 26 years old, had studied in France and Germany without notable success, and could be described as an obscure returnee from abroad.

Have you ever wondered why such a young man, who had not received formal education in Europe and held no significant degrees or titles, suddenly became the second-in-command at Whampoa, next to the principal? Was it his handsome appearance or some extraordinary ability?

The truth is, neither of these was the reason. A key figure in this story is Zhang Shenfu. Zhang was a lecturer at Peking University and one of the three founding members of the CPC, the other two being Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. When the Russians first came to China to spread revolution and find candidates, Zhang Shenfu was among the first they contacted. However, in 1925, Zhang voluntarily withdrew from the party due to political disagreements, and the CPC avoided mentioning him in history.

Zhang Shenfu had taught at the University of Lyon in France, where he met Zhou Enlai and introduced him to the CPC. Zhang also visited the Soviet Union, where he met Chiang Kai-shek, who was also there for inspection. During the honeymoon period of the KMT-CPC cooperation, the two hit it off. After the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy, Zhang Shenfu was appointed Vice Director of the Political Department through Chiang’s recommendation.

Chiang Kai-shek’s nomination of Zhang Shenfu was also due to Zhang's background with the Comintern. With Sun Yat-sen’s policy of alliance with Russia and the Communists, most of the funding and weapons for the Whampoa Military Academy initially came from Soviet support. It was natural to appoint a representative with a Comintern background as a way to thank the financial supporter.

However, Zhang Shenfu was a scholar, naturally free-spirited, and lacked military background, so he quickly had conflicts with Chiang Kai-shek and left his position. Before leaving, he recommended his successor, Zhou Enlai. As Zhang’s recommendation was from the principal, there was no reason for the other party to refuse. Zhou Enlai was then recalled to China and became the Director of the Political Department at Whampoa in November 1924.

The reason Zhang Shenfu recommended Zhou Enlai, besides their personal connection, was that Zhou Enlai was also a key figure cultivated by the Comintern. During his time in France and Germany, Zhou received training from Dimitrov, Chairman of the Comintern’s Intelligence Bureau, laying the foundation for creating the CPC's intelligence system upon his return. Zhou’s Comintern background was not only crucial for his appointment as Director at Whampoa but also key to his rise in the CPC, surpassing native figures like Mao Zedong.

In summary, Zhou Enlai’s appointment as Director of the Political Department at Whampoa at age 26 was not due to personal capability but because he was a representative cultivated by the Comintern, a classic example of foreign influence.

Zhou Enlai’s European Experience

Zhou Enlai’s experience in Europe was crucial for him. Besides acquiring an unmatched envoy status, Zhou utilized the CPC's European branch to establish a faction within the party, which was extremely important for his political career. The list of notable figures includes Zhu De, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Li Fuchun, Li Lisan, Li Weihan, Nie Rongzhen, Cai Hesen, Yun Daiying, Chen Yannian, Xiang Jingyu, and Cai Chang. These individuals played key roles in Zhou Enlai’s long-term influence within the party.

Early CPC Intelligence Work

Zhou Enlai made significant contributions to early CPC intelligence work, but also left behind a trail of brutal killings. The most notorious was the “Gu Shunzhang extermination case,” which shocked Shanghai.

Gu Shunzhang, originally from Baoshan in Shanghai, had mingled with the “Green Gang” in his early years. Later, he was recruited by the CPC for organizing worker movements and was sent to the Soviet Union in 1926 for systematic intelligence training. Upon returning, he became Zhou Enlai’s right-hand man and the actual leader of the CPC’s “Special Service.” To conceal his intelligence work, Gu Shunzhang maintained a public false identity as a magician, Hua Guangqi, which was quite famous and frequently performed across the country.

In March 1931, while performing in Hankou, Wuhan, Gu Shunzhang was recognized by a CPC traitor named You Chongxin in the audience. Gu was soon captured and imprisoned. Lacking resolve, Gu quickly defected but sought to trade his CPC intelligence for favorable treatment by demanding a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek.

At this time, Qian Zhuangfei, an undercover agent Zhou Enlai had placed within the KMT, learned of Gu Shunzhang’s betrayal and immediately notified Zhou Enlai, allowing Zhou to avoid a disaster. Although Zhou successfully escaped, Gu Shunzhang’s betrayal led to the complete destruction of the CPC’s underground organization in Shanghai, resulting in the arrest of numerous CPC infiltrators.

To retaliate, Zhou Enlai personally orchestrated the revenge against Gu Shunzhang’s family. After Gu’s capture, his family hid in the French Concession in Shanghai at Aitang Village, numbers 33 and 37, now 110 and 102 Yuqing Road in Xuhui District. In May 1931, Zhou Enlai, leading a team of CPC “Special Service” killers, including Kang Sheng, Hong Yangsheng, Chen Yangshan, and Wang Shide, broke into Gu’s home and killed 11 people, including Gu’s wife, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, nanny, and even visitors.

Zhou Enlai feared that using guns would alert neighbors and using knives would leave bloodstains, so all 11 victims were strangled to death. Among them were innocent individuals, such as Gu Shunzhang’s sister-in-law Zhang Jiabao, a rural woman visiting Shanghai, who had no prior connection to Gu and was killed for no reason.

An even more tragic case was that of Si Li, who happened to be visiting Gu’s home to play mahjong. Si Li had once saved Zhou Enlai’s life. Si Li, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, had a teacher-student relationship with Zhou. His brother, Si Lie, was a commander in the KMT’s 26th Army. In April 1927, during the KMT-CPC split, Si Lie had captured Zhou Enlai and prepared to execute him. However, Si Li persuaded his brother to spare Zhou, thus saving Zhou’s life.

Si Li, who had previously joined the CPC but was expelled in 1929 due to internal party struggles, maintained contact with many party members, including Gu Shunzhang. On the day of the massacre, Si Li happened to visit Gu’s home but fell victim to Zhou Enlai’s revenge, despite having saved Zhou’s life.

At the time, there were also two children in Gu’s family, Gu Shunzhang’s 8-year-old daughter Gu Liqun and his 12-year-old brother-in-law Zhang Changgeng. The CPC killers, unable to bring themselves to harm the children, considered them unlikely to understand or pose a threat, so they were spared.

The 11 bodies were buried in the family’s courtyard. Zhou Enlai had a deep pit, 8 meters deep, dug for the burial and covered it with concrete.

In addition to Gu Shunzhang’s family, Zhou Enlai also carried out assassinations of underground party members suspected of betrayal. In total, 39 people were killed, many of whom had not betrayed the party but were killed due to Zhou Enlai’s suspicions.

Initially, this event went unnoticed, but four months after the massacre, Zhang Changgeng, Gu’s 12-year-old brother-in-law who had escaped, encountered one of the CPC killers, Wang Shide, in the concession. Zhang, showing great courage, grabbed Wang and shouted, attracting the attention of concession police, leading to Wang’s capture and the case coming to light.

Due to the brutality of the case, the concession police initially doubted it until 39 bodies were unearthed, revealing the truth. The media coverage caused a great stir in Shanghai, altering public perception of the CPC and leading to its retreat to Ruijin in Jiangxi.

There has been a saying in the Chinese underworld for ages: "Trouble should not reach family members." This means that regardless of how much violence occurs, it should not harm unrelated family members. However, the massacre in Aitang Village orchestrated by Zhou Enlai can be considered a breach of this rule, especially since he even killed his own savior. Such actions are beyond the capability of ordinary people.

The Jiangxi Mass Graves Incident

Actually, Zhou Enlai had another lesser-known case of purging, which was the "Jiangxi Mass Graves Incident." In mid-June 1934, after the failure of the Fifth Anti-Encirclement Campaign, the CCP decided to break out. To ensure that there were no incidents of escape or surrender during the breakout, Zhou Enlai ordered the Political Security Bureau to carry out large-scale purges, resolutely eliminating those Red Army soldiers and officers deemed untrustworthy, as well as the weak, ill, and disabled.

The Political Security Bureau of the CCP was established in the spring of 1931, modeled after the Soviet secret police organization "Cheka," which was the predecessor of the KGB. The Political Security Bureau was somewhat like the Ming Dynasty's Eastern and Western Factories, with the authority to arrest, interrogate, and execute anyone suspected of counter-revolutionary activities at any time. Aside from high-ranking party cadres needing central approval, the execution of lower-level cadres and ordinary civilians did not require any official authorization; they could be killed at will.

To deal with this large number of "wavering cadres" and "opposing classes," Zhou Enlai executed thousands of his own comrades in the deep mountains north of Ruijin and at the border with Yundu. This is the origin of the "Jiangxi Mass Graves" incident. This brutal historical massacre was only declared over more than a month after the main Red Army forces broke out.

At that time, there was a senior CCP general named Gong Chu, who was the commander of the Red Seventh Army and had also served as the chief of staff of the Central Red Army, holding a high position in the Red Army. Due to his opposition to the brutal internal purges, he was specifically criticized by Zhou Enlai in a meeting and had his party membership revoked. Later, after the CCP's Long March, he defected to the Kuomintang and became known as the "first traitor of the Red Army."

Gong Chu wrote a book titled "Gong Chu's Memoirs," which recorded that during the Red Army's retreat, members of the Political Security Bureau executed those fallen behind and those unable to be transported, without mercy, to prevent them from being captured and leaking secrets. Gong Chu also witnessed the chief of staff of the Red Twelfth Army, Lin Ye, and his wife being hacked to death by their own people merely due to suspicion of potential betrayal, without any evidence. Another Red Army senior general, Li Mingrui, a famous general during the Northern Expedition and former supreme commander of the Nationalist army in Guangxi, was also killed by his own guards due to suspicion of being a spy.

These chilling purges made Gong Chu lose all confidence in the CCP, leading to his defection. Gong Chu wrote in his book: "Who among the Red Army's fighters and commanders does not know about the massacre before the withdrawal from the Central Soviet Area? Such brutal acts of cruelty against fellow comrades, such inhumane methods, are beyond what a person with a conscience can tolerate. Under the tight control of the Political Security Bureau, the people's actions and speech had long lost their freedom, and even their lives were in the hands of others. Isn't this revolution just self-deception?"

Zhou Enlai During the Great Famine

The official CCP history often praises Zhou Enlai as "loving the people like his own children." For example, a text we learned in elementary school, "The Premier's White Shirt," tells of him giving a white shirt to a civilian who was knocked down by his car. However, considering that someone who could be so ruthless towards his own colleagues, how could he possibly treat unrelated civilians well?

This is most evident in his actions during the Great Famine. At the beginning of the "Great Leap Forward," Zhou Enlai advocated halting the reckless advance but was severely criticized by Mao. To protect himself, Zhou Enlai quickly reversed his stance and began supporting the "Great Leap Forward," no longer mentioning the real situation. Liu Shaoqi even dared to criticize Mao, saying, "Cannibalism, history will record it for you and me!" Zhou Enlai, on the other hand, said nothing.

After the start of the Great Famine in 1959, Zhou Enlai drafted a notice titled "Urgent Measures to Solve the Current Oil Supply Problem," deciding to stop supplying edible oil to rural areas. In essence, this policy sacrificed rural areas to preserve the cities. At that time, China did not lack food; instead, some food was stored to ensure city supply, while another part was used for export to earn foreign exchange.

Since the CCP's relations with major countries were poor and it was practicing isolationism, it urgently needed foreign exchange to import essential industrial goods and gold reserves. According to the 1983 "China Statistical Yearbook" compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics, influenced by the "Great Leap Forward," the national grain production in 1959 decreased by 16 million tons compared to 1958, while exports actually increased by 2.23 million tons. In 1960, grain production continued to decrease by 5.3 million tons, but grain exports increased to 2.65 million tons.

During the three years of the Great Famine, China's total grain exports amounted to 6.8 million tons. Based on the standard of 300 jin (approximately 150 kilograms) of grain per person per year for most farmers at that time, 6.8 million tons of grain would have been enough to feed 40 million people for a whole year. This means that if this grain had not been exported, it could have completely saved the millions who starved to death.

Even more bizarrely, at that time, some people in the State Council suggested using China's gold reserves to buy grain. However, Zhou Enlai, who was not very knowledgeable about economics, believed that hard currency must be used as the country's backing and that international gold prices were low. As a result, he insisted on buying hundreds of thousands of taels of gold annually with the scarce foreign exchange, continuing to buy gold during the three years of the Great Famine until 1970. At that time's prices, the money used to buy 100,000 taels of gold could have bought 100 million jin of rice. He preferred to spend money on gold rather than on life-saving food.

Moreover, during this period, Zhou Enlai increased foreign aid to fulfill Mao's dream of being the leader of the global communist movement, even as the country was ravaged by starvation. For example, in 1961, when the Soviet Union cut off economic aid to Albania, the CCP not only provided several hundred thousand tons of food aid to Albania but also offered 250 million yuan in aid and undertook the free construction of 19 complete projects in Albania.

It even happened that when the CCP was already on the brink of collapse and had purchased an emergency shipment of food from Canada, Albania requested aid from China. Zhou Enlai then decided that the food aid ship, still at sea, should turn around and head for Albania.

In 2016, the Hong Kong Cultural and Arts Publishing House published a book titled "Zhou Enlai Behind the Mask," which included statistics. During the Great Famine, under Zhou Enlai's organization, the CCP exported 4.74 million tons of grain to communist countries in Eastern Europe at low prices, donated 30 million rubles worth of goods and 3.5 million pounds in cash to Hungary, provided billions of rubles worth of food to East Germany, and offered 20 billion yuan worth of materials to Vietnam. Albania received a total of 10 billion yuan, plus aid to Romania, Cambodia, Cuba, Tanzania, and Palestine, bringing the total foreign aid to 6.92% of the GDP.

In a 1964 State Council report, Zhou Enlai proudly stated: "Not only have we repaid our debts, but we have also provided much more funds and materials than the amount of external debt repayment during this period to support socialist and nationalist countries." His pride was built on the suffering of tens of millions of Chinese people. In their eyes, the lives of ordinary Chinese people were truly less valuable than pigs or dogs.

So, how many people died during the Great Famine? At the end of 1961, then Minister of Grain Chen Guodong and Minister of Statistics Jia Qiyun provided Zhou Enlai with a report summarizing the number of people who died of starvation nationwide. However, Zhou Enlai ordered the report to be destroyed. Former National Bureau of Statistics Director Li Chengrui published an article in 1997 in "Studies on CCP History," admitting that the death data for those three years was classified and could not be made public. Historian Yang Jisheng, who investigated this matter, compiled data from local chronicles and estimated that approximately 37.5 million people died during the three years of the Great Famine. This figure is considered quite reliable, as the number of deaths in Sichuan alone exceeded 10 million. Therefore, the nationwide death toll would certainly be higher, but the exact figure might never be found in the files ordered to be destroyed by Zhou Enlai.

Zhou Enlai During the Cultural Revolution

However, this bloody memory will never be erased. Today's CCP party history blames Liu Shaoqi's death on the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong. But what role did Zhou Enlai play in this process?

Wu Faxian, a trusted lieutenant of Lin Biao and former commander of the Air Force, said in his memoir Years of Hardship: "After the Cultural Revolution began, the central government established 14 special central task forces. The decision on what kind of task forces to establish, who would be in charge, and the selection of personnel were all personally decided by Zhou Enlai and then submitted to Mao Zedong for approval. Among these, Zhou Enlai was the head of the Liu Shaoqi task force."

Mr. Li Rui, who once served as the Executive Deputy Minister of the Central Organization Department, was interviewed by writer Shan Shaojie. In the interview, Mr. Li Rui mentioned that in 1983, he was ordered to destroy a large number of top-secret documents, including those originally belonging to the Liu Shaoqi task force. Among these top-secret documents were two drafts of a verdict for Liu Shaoqi, one written by Jiang Qing and the other drafted by Zhou Enlai. The draft by Zhou Enlai contained four charges, which were written in his own handwriting. Compared to Jiang Qing's charges, Zhou Enlai's accusations against Liu Shaoqi were far more severe. Zhou Enlai's note included the statement: "Liu the traitor deserves to be killed." These top-secret documents were later destroyed under the strong insistence of Deng Yingchao to protect Zhou Enlai's image.

On September 25, 1968, Zhou Enlai personally drafted the materials on Liu Shaoqi's crimes for Mao Zedong's review. At the 12th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhou Enlai personally read this report. He said: "Liu the traitor Shaoqi is a long-standing traitor, a major thief, an internal spy, a secret agent, and a traitor to the Han nation. The evidence and witness materials gathered by the task force are sufficient to prove that Liu the traitor is a counter-revolutionary with all five poisons and ten evils."

In fact, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi had long worked together within the party without major conflicts or grievances. The two even teamed up after 1949 to bring down Gao Gang, a "northeastern king" groomed by Mao, ultimately forcing Gao to commit suicide. However, when Zhou Enlai learned that Mao wanted to bring down Liu Shaoqi, he ruthlessly sided with Mao and dealt Liu Shaoqi a fatal blow. Although Mao was the main culprit in Liu Shaoqi's death, Zhou Enlai's involvement made it even worse. Zhou Enlai's consistent stance of following Mao closely, adapting to the wind, and adding insult to injury was also evident in the case of He Long.

He Long, who was once the second vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, fell out of favor with Mao after expressing dissatisfaction with the Cultural Revolution. As a result, he was targeted. The head of the He Long task force was also Zhou Enlai. In January 1967, after being criticized, He Long hoped Zhou Enlai could rescue him. He Long and Zhou Enlai had deep connections, having been partners in the Nanchang Uprising, and Zhou Enlai had been He Long's party introducer. After being criticized, He Long and his wife, Xue Ming, specifically went to Zhongnanhai to seek Zhou Enlai's help. Zhou Enlai told them, "I have already arranged a place for you in the Western Hills of Beijing. You two should go there to avoid trouble." He Long believed him, only to be placed under soft detention in the Western Hills and had his handgun confiscated.

During his detention, He Long suffered from a lack of food and clothing, eventually having to drink rainwater to quench his thirst. With diabetes requiring regular treatment, he was effectively left to die. By August 1969, He Long died of illness in the Western Hills. He was still naively waiting for Zhou Enlai to rescue him, not realizing that his fate was precisely Zhou Enlai's arrangement. He was also unaware that the charge of "attempted betrayal" against him was personally decided by Zhou Enlai.

Mr. Gao Wenqian, a former researcher at the Central Party Literature Research Office and head of the Zhou Enlai Study Group, wrote a book titled Zhou Enlai in His Later Years in 2003. Regarding He Long's case, he said: "On September 13, the Central Committee officially approved the case against He Long, and the examination report submitted to the Central Committee was personally handled by Zhou Enlai. He made modifications and wrote extensive comments. No matter how many reasons people can find to defend or exonerate Zhou Enlai, he is inevitably responsible for He Long's persecution and death."

Sadly, after the Lin Biao defection incident in 1971, known as the "9.13 Incident," Mao Zedong, in order to find evidence against Lin Biao, attributed He Long's death to Lin Biao. Subsequently, He Long was posthumously rehabilitated. At this time, Zhou Enlai reappeared as the good person. In 1975, during He Long's ashes interment ceremony, Zhou Enlai, who was already suffering from cancer, insisted on attending the memorial. He addressed He Long's wife, Xue Ming, saying the familiar lines: "Xue Ming, I am late, and I did not protect him well." He even bowed seven times with tears in his eyes in front of He Long's portrait. If He Long's spirit was still around, he might not know if the coffin lid could still hold.

(To be continued, please see the next article)